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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3303 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MALIK BLAND, a/k/a Easy, 
 
            Malik Bland, 
                                Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-07-cr-00737-006 
District Judge: The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
ROSENTHAL, District Judge*
 
 
(Filed: September 25, 2012) 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________                              
 
 
                                                 
*The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 A jury convicted Malik Bland of conspiring to possess with the intent to 
distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1).  The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Bland 
a substantial downward variance from a guideline range of 292 to 365 months by 
imposing a sentence of 192 months of imprisonment.  Bland appealed, challenging 
his conviction and sentence.1
I. 
  Although we will affirm his conviction, we will 
vacate Bland’s sentence and remand this matter to the District Court.  Specifically, 
we direct the District Court to conduct further proceedings as to the weight of 
crack cocaine for which Bland should be held responsible for sentencing purposes. 
 Bland sold crack cocaine in Philadelphia at the corner of 61st Street and 
Glenmore Avenue.  Around the same time, a group led by Kareem Smith was 
distributing cocaine and crack cocaine in parts of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and 
Cecil County, Maryland.  Landrum Thompson worked for Smith, selling at the 
same street corner as Bland.  In October of 2003, when one of Smith’s sellers in 
Maryland was arrested, Smith and Thompson approached Bland about selling for 
them in Maryland.  Bland “wanted to make money hustling.”  In his view, “[w]hat 
[he] was doing on the corner wasn’t cutting it.”  Bland accepted the offer, and 
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advised Smith that he “was hungry.”   
 Within a week of being set up in Smith’s house in Maryland, Bland sold 
crack to an undercover officer.  During that transaction, Bland gave the undercover 
officer a piece of paper in the event the undercover officer needed to contact 
Bland.  The paper contained Bland’s name and cell number, as well as the names 
of Smith and Thompson.  Several days later, the undercover officer called Bland’s 
number and asked to purchase more crack.  Bland advised the undercover officer 
to come to his house, stating “my man is here.” After the transaction was 
completed, Bland was arrested.  He was eventually convicted of violating 
Maryland law and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.   
 Bland was released from prison on January 31, 2006.  At some point 
thereafter, Bland returned to selling crack with Thompson at the corner of 61st and 
Glenmore Avenue.2  On October 5, 2006, Bland was arrested and charged with 
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of 
Pennsylvania law.  He returned to jail, eventually pled guilty on January 23, 2007, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
2 The transcript contains the following exchange between the prosecutor and 
Thompson: 
 Q. When did [Bland] come and when did he stop, that is the question I’m 
  asking. 
 A. I guess he stopped October [5, 2006, when he was arrested]. 
 Q. In about October.  And how long had he been out there at that point? 
 A. A couple months. 
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and was sentenced to six to twenty-three months of imprisonment.   
 Subsequently, a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania returned a second superseding indictment, charging Bland and eight 
others with conspiring to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine.  Bland and three of 
his co-defendants went to trial.  A jury found each of them guilty of the conspiracy 
offense.  Bland moved for a judgment of acquittal, challenging the sufficiency of 
the evidence.   
 During a hearing on the motion, Bland asserted that he was an independent 
salesman and that there was no evidence to show that he was a member of the 
conspiracy.  In addition, he argued that he should not be held responsible for the 
amount of crack sold by the conspiracy while he was incarcerated on the Maryland 
offense.  When the District Court asked the government what connection Bland 
had to the conspiracy during his imprisonment, the AUSA replied:  “None.  During 
the period of time when he was incarcerated, he was not involved, I agree with that 
a hundred percent.”  The Court inquired how Bland could be charged with being a 
member from 2002 to 2007.  The AUSA replied:  
Because he was a member of the conspiracy in the early years, and as 
soon as he got out of jail he went right back to his role that he held 
before he went to jail as a seller for the same conspiracy that 
overlapped his incarceration.  The conspiracy didn’t die when Mr. 
Bland left.  He entered, and he was in and out, just like Mr. Smith was 
in and out during the course of the conspiracy.   
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The Court noted that Smith maintained a role while he was in prison, but that 
Bland was “not one of the brains behind this scheme.”  The AUSA agreed Bland 
was not key to the operation and that Bland’s sporadic membership presented a 
sentencing issue.  The AUSA further stated: “I agree that during the period of time 
he’s incarcerated, we can’t attribute anything to him.”  In response to further 
questioning, the AUSA stated that “[t]here’s no evidence that [Bland] had contact 
with any member of the conspiracy during that period of time” he was in jail.  
Several days after the hearing, the District Court denied the motion for judgment of 
acquittal.   
 On July 16, 2010, the District Court issued a memorandum, setting forth its 
findings as to each defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy and the quantity of 
drugs for which each defendant would be held liable for purposes of computing 
that defendant’s sentencing guideline range.  Because “Bland never signified an 
intent to withdraw from the conspiracy (as he rejoined the . . . conspiracy 
immediately upon release from incarceration),” the Court concluded that he was 
“involved for the full three years” from October 20, 2003, through October 5, 2006 
(147 weeks).  The Court determined that approximately 9 ounces, or 225 grams of 
crack, was sold during each week of the conspiracy.  “Based on [Bland’s] role as a 
seller, incarceration due to his . . . activities, and the fact that drug quantities being 
distributed throughout his time in the conspiracy were ‘reasonably foreseeable,’” 
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the Court found that the Government “demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Defendant Bland [was] responsible for accomplice attribution of the 
average weekly crack sales[,]” totaling 37.4 kilograms of crack.   
 This quantity of crack cocaine resulted in a base offense level of 38, which 
was adjusted upwards by two levels to 40 because of a dangerous weapons 
enhancement.  Bland’s total offense level and his criminal history category of I 
produced a guideline range of 292 to 365 months.   
 At sentencing, Bland again challenged the quantification of crack for which 
he was responsible for sentencing purposes, emphasizing that he was involved for 
one week in 2003 before his arrest and for only “several months in ’06.”  The 
Court rejected his argument.  It explained that Bland had spent time in jail, but that 
“nearly as [he] went out the door [he] rejoined the conspiracy.”  Reasoning that 
Bland was “kind of in inactive status” during his incarceration, the Court 
concluded that he had “never left the conspiracy.”  As a result, Bland’s guideline 
range did not change.  The Court granted a downward variance, imposing a 
sentence of 192 months of imprisonment.  Bland filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
 Bland contends that the District Court erred by denying his motion for a 
judgment of acquittal because there was no evidence of his membership in the 
conspiracy at any point from 2002 through 2007.  In reviewing a district court’s 
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denial of a Rule 29 motion, “we review the trial record in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence.”  United 
States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation, internal quotation 
marks, and brackets omitted).  The trial record demonstrates, and our brief factual 
recitation confirms, that there is no merit to Bland’s argument.  He either was 
successfully recruited by Smith and Thompson or eagerly joined what he 
understood to be a drug organization operating in two states.   
III. 
 Bland asserts that, even if we conclude there was sufficient evidence to 
uphold his conviction, the District Court erred in its computation of the quantity of 
drugs attributable to him.  “When reviewing the sentencing decisions of the district 
courts, we exercise plenary review over legal questions about the meaning of the 
sentencing guidelines, but apply the deferential clearly erroneous standard to 
factual determinations underlying their application.”  United States v. Collado, 975 
F.2d 985, 990 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets 
omitted).  
 In Collado, we explained that “whether an individual defendant may be held 
accountable for amounts of drugs involved in reasonably foreseeable transactions 
conducted by co-conspirators depends upon the degree of the defendant’s 
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involvement in the conspiracy.”  Id. at 995.  We cautioned that “it is not enough to 
merely determine that the defendant’s criminal activity was substantial.  Rather, a 
searching and individualized inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each 
defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy is critical to ensure that the defendant’s 
sentence accurately reflects his or her role.”  Id.   
 In United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 732 (3d Cir. 1994), we addressed 
Price’s argument that he was inappropriately credited for cocaine dispensed by the 
conspiracy after he was imprisoned. We rejected “a per se rule that arrest 
automatically bars attribution to a defendant of drugs distributed after that date.”  
Id.  Yet we agreed that “since ‘[t]he relevant conduct provision limits accomplice 
attribution to conduct committed in furtherance of the activity the defendant agreed 
to undertake,’ a defendant cannot be held responsible for conduct committed after 
he or she could no longer assist or monitor his or her co-conspirators.”  Id. (quoting 
Collado, 975 F.2d at 997); see also United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 945 
(5th Cir. 1994) (observing that “[b]ecause a defendant’s incarceration is not an 
affirmative act on the part of a defendant, it cannot, by itself, constitute withdrawal 
or abandonment” from a conspiracy, but that “incarceration may still have had 
some effect on the foreseeability of the acts of his coconspirators” for sentencing 
purposes). 
 Here, the District Court rejected Bland’s argument that he should not be held 
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liable for the amount of drugs sold during his incarceration and until he rejoined 
the conspiracy at some point in 2006.  It reasoned that Bland had not withdrawn 
from the conspiracy and that he immediately rejoined the conspiracy after his 
release.  Whether Bland had withdrawn from the conspiracy, however, is not 
determinative of whether he should be held liable for sentencing purposes for the 
amount of drugs sold by his coconspirators during his incarceration and for that 
period of time following his release when he had yet to return to his role as a street 
seller.  Rather, that determination must be based on his involvement in the 
conspiracy at the relevant period of time.  Collado, 975 F.2d at 995.  Although the 
District Court appropriately conducted an individualized inquiry for each 
defendant as Collado instructs, it did not focus on the circumstances surrounding 
Bland’s involvement during either his incarceration or the eight month period 
following his release.  Id.    
 Our review fails to reveal any evidence to support the District Court’s 
accomplice attribution during Bland’s incarceration.  There is no evidence that 
Bland was involved in the conspiracy while in prison from October of 2003 until 
January 31, 2006.  In fact, during the March 5, 2010 hearing, the government 
acknowledged as much, stating that there was “no evidence that [Bland] had any 
contact with” his coconspirators during his incarceration.  In the absence of some 
evidence that Bland had any involvement in the conspiracy during his 
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incarceration, see Collado, 975 F.2d at 995, we conclude that the District Court 
erred by attributing to Bland the amount of drugs sold by the conspiracy for each 
week that he was in prison.   
 Furthermore, the evidence indicates that Bland was released from prison on 
January 31, 2006 and then arrested on October 5, 2006.  During that eight month 
period, the trial record establishes that Bland was involved in the conspiracy 
selling crack cocaine for only “a couple months” before his arrest.  SA826.  Yet the 
District Court, without explanation, held Bland liable for the entire eight months of 
drug activity following his release from prison.   
 Accordingly, although we will affirm Bland’s conviction, we will vacate his 
sentence and remand this matter for further fact finding with regard to accomplice 
attribution when he was incarcerated and during the eight month period following 
his release from prison.   
 
